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Determining the Extent of Admissibility of
Reservations: Some Considerations with
Regard to the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea
LINDA

L. HAzou*

INTRODUCTION

Particular problems are posed with regard to the admissibility
of reservations to the proposed United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. These are due to its comprehensive nature, as evidenced by
the fact that it will contain over 300 articles and several annexes,
dealing with issues as diverse as delimitation of ocean space, scientific
research, environmental control, commercial activities, and settlement of disputes. It will be a multifaceted treaty which will contain
legislative elements, representing the progressive development of
international law and codification of customary norms, as well as
elements of constituent instruments which embody both organizational and regulatory provisions.' The complexity of this convention will render the determination of admissibility of reservations
troublesome. It must be decided whether reservations will be
allowed at all, and if so, to what extent.
A reservation has been defined as "a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
treaty in their application to that State."' The nature of a reservation is that it is a declaration, made unilaterally, outside of the
treaty and not within it.' However, a statement which is explanatory
or is merely a declaration of intent is not a reservation unless it denotes a variation in the legal effect of the treaty vis-A-vis the reservAssistant Law of the Sea Officer, Secretariat of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. A.B., Smith College, 1975; J.D. Syracuse College of
Law, 1978. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not have any
official standing.
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Y.B.

INT'L L. 146 (1973).
2. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(d), done May 23, 1969, U.N.
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ing state.' Consent, being the basis of treaty power,5 is also the basis
underlying the validity of the reservation.' Consent to the reservation may be given by the states parties tacitly, impliedly, or expressly, either at the time of the formulation of the reservation,
thereafter, or in advance where the reservation is formulated in accordance with a specific reservations clause of the treaty in question.' When a reservation has been consented to by a state party, it
has the effect of operating reciprocally as between the reserving state
and the accepting state, "so that it modifies the treaty for both of
them in their mutual relations to the extent of the reserved provisions." 8 However, it does not have the effect of modifying the treaty
for the accepting state vis-A-vis other, nonreserving states, since they
have not accepted it as a term of the treaty inter se.' So in fact, a
multiplicity of levels of participation in the convention is possible in
that there may be a multiplicity of degrees of its acceptance.
Implicit in the question of acceptability of reservations is that of
their admissibility, for acceptance involves a prior determination
that a reservation must be admissible. However, reservations may
not be appropriately admissible to all provisions of a treaty. A distinction may be drawn between "reciprocal" and "normative" provisions."' It is contended that reservations may only be appropriate
vis-A-vis reciprocal provisions, "the essence and operation of which
involves the grant by each of the parties to each of the others of a
number of reciprocal rights, benefits, or privileges which the parties
accord to, and receive from, one another inter se."" Reservations to
such provisions could operate between two states without affecting
the rights of third states.' 2 Normative provisions, on the other hand,
are those which "operate for each party per se, and not between the
parties inter se-coupled with the further peculiarity that they involve mainly the assumption of duties and obligations.' 3 A

4. Id. at 162.
5. Id.at 102.
6. Id. at 183.

7.Id.
8. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, [1966] Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N (vol. II), adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) at its 18th
session. Commentary to art. 19, $ 1, reprinted in U.N. Conference on the Law of
Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11/Add.2 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Draft Articles on
the Law of Treaties].

9. Id.
10. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 145.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 146.
13. Id. at 145.
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nonreserving state could not alter its behavior toward a reserving
state in regard to the operation of a reservation to a normative provision without violating its obligations towards other nonreserving
states." It would seem, then, that one of the aspects which would
have to be taken into consideration in determining the admissibility
of reservations to the Law of the Sea Convention is the categorization of provisions as to whether they are reciprocal or normative.
However, there are other characteristics of the treaty which will
further complicate the determination of admissibility, the most important of which is the fact that the treaty will be what has been
called a "package deal."' 5 That is, the substance of the treaty will be
the result of a process of arduous negotiation and compromise over a
period of more than ten years in which more than 150 states will
have participated. As a consequence of this process, the content of
many provisions will be wholly dependent on the content of many
other, not necessarily related, provisions. Some areas of the Convention which immediately come to mind in this respect are aspects of
Part VI on the Continental Shelf, Part XI on the International Seabed Area, some provisions of Part XIII on Marine Scientific Research, and areas of Part V on the Exclusive Economic Zone, among
others. A reservation to one such provision may tend to weaken, if
not render meaningless, the whole package. A further element which
will make the determination of admissibility complex is the fact that
certain sections of the treaty which relate to the Authority and the
Law of the Sea Tribunal comprise constituent instruments of international organizations, as traditionally no reservations are allowed
to instruments of this nature. The process of selecting those provisions to which reservations will be allowed, if at all, therefore becomes very difficult.
Given the crucial role that reservations play in the formation
and interpretation of international law, the General Assembly at its
sixth session, made the following recommendations:
[Tihat organs of the United Nations, specialized agencies and
States should, in the course of preparing multilateral conventions, consider the insertion therein of provisions relating to the
admissibility or non-admissibility of reservations and to the effect to be attributed to them; ....

14. Id. at 146.
15. See, e.g., Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea 66, 69 (vol. VIII)
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Third LOS Conference]; and U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/91
at 1 (1974).
16. G.A. Res. 598, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) (Jan. 12, 1952).
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In compliance with these recommendations, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has considered this issue,
though no conclusions have yet been reached, and has before it conference document A/Conf.62/L.13 which presents four alternative approaches. 7 These approaches are listed in article 7 as formulae A
through D, and encompass (1) the prohibition of all reservations, (2)
the specific enumeration of permissible reservations, (3) the prohibition of some reservations, and (4) the noninclusion of a reservations
clause at all. The issues presented by each of these schemes, as well
as their appropriateness for inclusion in the proposed Law of the Sea
Convention will be discussed within the framework of the following
questions:
I. Is a reservation clause desirable?
II. If there is a reservations clause, in what manner
should admissibility be regulated?

III. Should reservations be allowed at all?
I.

Is A RESERVATIONS CLAUSE DESRABLE?

The first question which must be considered is whether or not a
17. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.13 App. I, art. 7 (1976) in Third LOS Conference at
126 (vol. VI).
RmERVATIONS

Formula A: No reservations permitted
"Reservations may not be made with respect to any of the
provisions of the present Convention."
Formula B: Certain reservations permitted
"Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, make reservations in respect of the following provisions of
the present Convention: . . . "
Formula C: Certain reservations not permitted
"At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any
State may make reservations to any article of the present
Convention other than articles ... "
Specification of a procedure for acceptance
or rejection of reservations
"A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of
the present Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of
the bodies established by the present Convention be allowed. A
reservation shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if at
least two thirds of the States parties to the present Convention
object to it."
Withdrawal of reservations
"Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification
to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received."
Formula D: No clause on reservations
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reservations clause should be included at all. It must be noted in
this respect, that the absence of a clause would not signify that there
would be complete freedom to declare any and all reservations.
Rather, the rules of customary international law would apply to
limit the extent to which reservations could be declared.
There are two objective rules of customary law which may limit
the freedom to propose reservations, but which apply only in certain
circumstances. The first is that no reservations are allowed to constituent instruments." It must be noted that it may not always be
easy to determine whether an instrument is in fact constitutional in
nature." This may be particularly true in the case of the Law of the
Sea." The second objective rule is that no reservations are allowed to
peremptory norms of international law, or rules of jus cogens. A peremptory norm, or jus cogens, has been defined as a "norm of general
international law . . .accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation
is permitted . . . .,,' As reservation involves derogation, it is clear
that no reservations could be permitted to a peremptory norm of international law.
While the Law of the Sea Convention does contain some
provisions which fall within these two categories, that is, jus cogens
and constituent instrument, most of its provisions do not. The
principle most often cited which would govern the admissibility of
reservations to such other provisions is the test of compatibility with
the object and purpose of the treaty in question. This test was first set
out by the International Court of Justice in the advisory opinion
relating to Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.2 The issue there had been the
posture of reserving states vis-A-vis nonreserving states, given the fact
that the Convention itself contained no clause regarding reservations.
The Court stated that the reserving state could be considered a party
to the Convention if the reservation were compatible with its "object
and purpose."n It was specified that the criteria used to determine
compatibility must be based on the individual characteristics of the
Convention concerned. 2' The Court suggested that the intention of the

18. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 169.
19. Ruda, supra note 3, at 187.
20. See pp. 77-78 infra.
21. Vienna Convention, art. 53, note 2 supra.
22. Opinion of May 28, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. 15.
23. Id. at 29.
24. Id. at 22ff, especially at 24 which reads in part, "[tihe object and purpose of
the Convention . . . limit both the freedom of making reservations and that of ob-

74

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 9:69

contracting parties as to the scope of the treaty may be a
determinative factor.?
The International Law Commission, in its draft articles on the
Law of Treaties, adopted the rationale of the compatibility test as
one "suitable for adoption as a general criterion of the legitimacy of
reservations to multilateral treaties and of objection to them.""6 It
was noted, however, that there was difficulty in applying the principles of that test, "especially where there is no tribunal or other organ
invested with standing competence to interpret the treaty."" In
practice, then, the application of the rule of compatibility is ultimately left to the individual state." As such, it is a completely subjective decision, which is finally expressed by means of the state's
acceptance of or objection to the reservation. However, although the
individual decision is presumably based on the object and purpose of
the treaty, this may not necessarily be the case. The state's decision
may in fact be based on whatever motives it deems fit.' Therefore,
while the acceptance of the reservation should be governed by the
need to preserve the integrity of the treaty, integrity being that
juridical value gleaned from the object and purpose of the treaty
which is the essence of the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations
achieved during the negotiations," this is not always the principal
consideration. Given a convention such as that on the Law of the Sea,
where the balance is particularly fragile, even one acceptance of a
reservation which could be construed as contravening the integrity of
the treaty could have disastrous consequences. This is complicated
further by the fact that due to the intricacy and diversity of the Law of
the Sea treaty, it may be difficult to determine the precise nature of
its multiple objects and purposes.
It is evident, therefore, that where there is no clause governing
the admissibility of reservations to the treaty, the treaty itself becomes exceptionally difficult to administer. There would be possible
an infinite multiplicity of degrees of its acceptance based on the
complete decentralization of authority to determine its legal effects.
The effect in the case of the Law of the Sea treaty could be to render
it completely meaningless. It would be ill-advised, therefore, to fail

jecting to them." See also Commentary to arts. 16 and 17, Draft Articles on the Law
of Treaties, supra note 8, at 4(d).
25. [1951] I.C.J. at 24.
26. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, at 10.
27. Id.
28. Ruda, supra note 3, at 186.
29. Id. at 190.
30. Id. at 186.
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to include a specific clause governing reservations to the Law of the
Sea treaty.
II. IF THERE IS A RESERVATIONS CLAUSE, IN WHAT MANNER SHOULD
ADMISSIBILITY BE REGULATED?
One of the principal drawbacks to the noninclusion of a specific
reservations clause is the completely subjective nature of the compatibility test as customarily practiced. It was pointed out during
the negotiations of the Vienna Convention that "[rieservations introduced an element of relativity and subjectivity into treaty relations
and [their admissibility] must therefore be made subject to objective
criteria, so as to limit the absolute freedom of States in the interests
of international co-operation."'"
The most effective method of controlling the admissibility of
reservations is to include in the treaty a provision which specifies
which reservations will be permitted and/or which will not. Such a
provision could either set out the provisions to which reservations
will specifically be allowed, or it could enumerate those to which reservations will be prohibited. Among alternatives to be considered by
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
presented in document A/Conf.62/L.1332 is one of each of these
clauses. Formula B of article 7 sets forth a clause which would involve
the enumeration of provisions to which reservations will be deemed
to be compatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty. The
inclusion of such a clause in the Law of the Sea treaty would involve
a prior determination by the Conference that certain reservations
will be deemed compatible with the objects and purposes of the
treaty.Where a reservation has been declared to one of the provisions
enumerated in the clause, it would not require acceptance by any
other state in order to be valid. 3 The effect would be that it is
deemed to be automatically accepted by all state parties.
Such a listing as under formula B could be exclusive, that is,
reservations would be admissible only to the articles cited therein, or
it might be possible to include a nonexclusive listing whereby other
reservations would be allowed if compatible. This would involve a
policy decision on the part of the Conference which would be effected by means of the language used in the clause. If the listing is
to be nonexclusive, and a reservation were to be declared in respect

31. Statement by Mr. Cuenca (Spain), 21st meeting of the Committee of the
Whole (Apr. 10, 1968), UN. Conference on the Law of Treaties 109, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.39/11 (1968).
32. Note 17 supra.
33. Vienna Convention, art. 20(1), note 2 supra.
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of a provision not specifically cited in the listing, its compatibility
with the objects and purposes of the treaty would have to be determined by some means.
Formula C of article 7," on the other hand, is a clause which
would enumerate those provisions of the treaty to which no reservations would be admissible. The inclusion of such a clause would involve a prior determination by the Conference that certain reservations will be deemed absolutely incompatible and, therefore, will not
be permissible. The implication of the use of such a clause would be
that reservations to provisions other than those cited therein may be
acceptable3 It must be noted that this does not signify that such
other reservations will automatically be acceptable, but rather, that
the rules of customary international law governing admissibility will
control. The application of these rules, though simplified somewhat
by the predetermination of incompatibility in some cases, would
nonetheless be intricate, and would involve those drawbacks of decentralization, multiplicity of degrees of acceptance of the convention, and subjectivity, discussed above. However, where there is a
specific clause governing admissibility, it may be possible to curb
the subjectivity of the compatibility test somewhat by delineating a
procedure whereby that test could be more objectively applied.
One approach to promote objectivity would involve the use of
the majority rule to determine compatibility. This would involve setting a time limit within which a state could declare its objection to a
reservation. By failing to lodge an objection within the time limit, a
state would be deemed to consider the reservation compatible."
Then, upon the expiration of the time period, the number of objecting states would be tallied, and if that number were to rise above
some predetermined figure, the reservation would be declared to be
incompatible and would be invalid.3 7 The duration of the time limit
would be arbitrarily set but a "more extensive period [may be]
preferable, in order that all doubt, in a field involving a rule that has a
residual character, may be avoided." The figure used to determine
compatibility could be an absolute number or a percentage of states
parties. In this connection, formula C39 suggests the use of a two-

34. Note 17 supra.
35. Id. at 128 n.24.
36. This alternative was considered by the ILC when preparing its draft convention on the law of treaties. DraftArticles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, at 23.
37. Id. at 11.
38. Ruda, supra note 3, at 185.
39. Note 17 supra, Specification of a procedure for acceptance or rejection of a
reservations clause.
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thirds majority of the states parties for such a determination.
Another alternative for objectively determining compatibility
would be to provide for the submission of the reservation in each
case to an impartial body, which would be entrusted with the task of
its interpretation. Although this is not an expedient method, it is the
customary procedure in the case of constituent instruments. The Vienna Convention, article 20, paragraph 3,40 requires the acceptance
of a reservation by the competent organ of the body being established. The rationale for such a requirement, according to the International Law Commission, is that
[iun the case of instruments which form the constitutions of international organizations, the integrity of the instrument is a
consideration which outweighs other considerations and . . . it
must be for the members of the organization, acting through its
competent organ, to determine how far any relaxation of the integrity of the instrument is acceptable."
This is, in effect, an extension of the majority rule, since in most
cases the competent organ will make decisions by means of a majority vote.2
One problem which arises with regard to the Law of the Sea
treaty is the question of which organ is the competent one. 3 With
respect to the Authority, would it be the Assembly, the Council, or
some other organ which would be competent? It is clear -that with
regard to a reservation to the provisions which establish the Law of
the Sea Tribunal, it would be the Tribunal itself which would be
empowered to make the determination of admissibility. However,
since the Tribunal would have competence to interpret the whole
treaty, perhaps it should also have competence to determine the
compatibility of reservations to parts of the treaty other than those
which established it. But, the Law of the Sea Tribunal would not be
an organ of the Authority, and therefore, it could not be the competent organ of the institution being established vis-A-vis the Authority. Furthermore, by the terms of the treaty itself, a state is not required to accept the jurisdiction of the Tribunal unless it has made a
specific declaration to that effect." In any event, it may be difficult

40. Vienna Convention, note 2 supra.
41. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, at 20.
42. Ruda, supra note 3, at 187.
43. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 153-54.
44. Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea: Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 1, art. 287, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10/Rev.1 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as ICNT/Rev. 1].
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to identify those provisions of the Law of the Sea treaty which are
constitutional in nature. In some cases there may be ambiguity,
since constitutional provisions may be located in various parts of the
body of the treaty itself, or in several of the annexes.
Another disadvantage of the system of acceptance by the organ
is that it only becomes possible to consult the competent organ of an
organization, whichever one it may be, after such organization becomes operational. 5 If the reservation is formulated before the competent organ is established, it would seem apparent that it could
have no legal effect until such time as the organ becomes established
and has occasion to pronounce on the question of compatibility."6
However, if the reservation is rejected by the organ at that time,
thereby precluding the acceptance of the reservation by any state, a
question may arise as to whether the reserving state could be considered a party to the convention. This may be a pivotal concern where
there is otherwise an issue of entry into force of the convention.' .
Formula C, the Specification of a procedure for acceptance or
rejection of reservations clause, provides that no reservation will be
allowed "the effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of the
bodies established by the present Convention."? It must be noted
that this may be a more restrictive test than a compatibility test as
customarily applied.
It is evident, then, that overall, the use of either formula B or
formula C will be far from simple in terms of application. What will
be involved is a detailed analysis of the objects and purposes of the
convention. Then, the Conference will need to undertake a scrupulous examination of each article of the treaty, to determine whether
or not a reservation thereto will contravene those objects and purposes, or whether the provision is constitutional in nature. In addition, the formulation of a residual procedure to be applied in the
case of reservations to provisions not specifically enumerated in the
clause, as well as in the case of the consituent elements of the treaty,

45, Supra note 17, at 128 n.26. Footnote 26 also notes that in the case of the Law
of the Sea, it may be possible to consult the Preparatory Commission or some organ of
the United Nations. See also Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, at
10.
46. Ruda, supra note 3, at 188.
46.1. In this case the competent organ may in fact be considering the question of
its own existence, for where there are too few nonreserving states to allow for entry
into force of the convention, the determination that declared reservations are compatible would be mandatory in order to enable entry into force and the coming into existence of the organ itself.
47. Note 17 supra.
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will be necessary.
III. SHOULD RESERVATIONS BE ALLOWED AT ALL?
By far the most expedient method of dealing with the question
of the admissibility of reservations is to include a clause, such as
that which is set out in formula A of document A/Conf.62/L.1348
which expressly prohibits their formulation.
Three considerations should be borne in mind in determining
the desirability of allowing reservations to a multilateral treaty.
These are:
(i) Flexibility, due to the necessity to meet all needs which
may arise in practice;
(ii) Simplicity, due to the fact that there must be clear and
firm standards to guide practice; and
(iii) Respect for the will of states and their sovereign equality."
Several arguments may be made in support of the disallowance
of any reservations to a multilateral treaty. Among these are that
the integrity of the treaty may be destroyed," that the principle of
certainty of law would be undermined by the allowance of reservations, and that confusion would ensue." These factors may weigh
more heavily where the desire for uniformity of law plays a strong
role." For example, the International Court of Justice noted in the
Genocide" opinion that the Genocide Convention was intended to
codify basic principles of morality for a purely humanitarian and
civilizing purpose.u It is undeniable that that Convention was intended to be universal in scope,u thereby establishing uniform rules
on the subject. Furthermore, the Court noted that the principles underlying the Convention are themselves principles of customary international law recognized by states as binding upon them, even
without any Conventional obligation." Both the universal character
48. Id.
49. Statement of Mr. Virally (France), 22nd Meeting of the Committee of the
Whole (Apr. 11, 1968), supra note 31, at 116.
50. A. McNAm, THE LAW o Taaxms 18 (1961). See also the Report of Mr. J. L.
Brierly, Special Rapporteur, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions
Doc. A/CN.4/41 (1951), reprintedin [19511 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N (vol. 11).

11 U.N.

51. See, e.g., the statement of Mr. Jhirad (India), 8th Plenary meeting (Apr. 22,
1958) 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/41 at 11 (1958),
and the statement of Mr. Gros (France), 9th Plenary meeting (Apr. 22, 1958) id. at
17.
52. [1951] Y.B. INT'L L. COmm'N, supra note 50, at 11.
53. [19511 I.C.J. 15.
54. Id. at 23.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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of those principles and the cooperation required to effectuate them
necessitates that any reservation which derogates from them be considered incompatible." It was indicated that these considerations
may outweigh any freedom of a state to declare a reservation by virtue of its sovereignty." By analogy, then, it would seem that reservations to those aspects of the Law of the Sea treaty which represent
jus cogens or customary norms of international law would not be
proper.
As to those aspects of the treaty which represent the progressive
development of international law, Brierly pointed out in his report to
the International Law Commission, that "one of the ways in which
international law is developed is by a consistent rule of general application being laid down in multilateral . . . conventions."'" Reservations by states to such provisions may "hinder the development of
international law by preventing the growth of a consistent rule of
general application."' 61 Therefore, if reservations were to be allowed
to provisions of this character, the purpose of the treaty to promote
progressive development of the law of the sea would be defeated.
The International Court of Justice has suggested that a determinative factor regarding the admissibility of reservations may be the
degree to which the allowability of reservations was contemplated
during the negotiation stages of the convention in question." In the
Genocide opinion, it was held that certain reservations had been
foreseen, and therefore, that reservations were allowable." An essential element taken into the Court's consideration was the use of majority rule as the voting procedure by which the Genocide Convention was adopted.13 However, it may be argued that with regard to
the Law of the Sea Convention, clearly no reservations were contemplated due to the use of consensus as the method of taking decisions.
Furthermore, such use of consensus by a conference in which over
150 states have participated should result in the emergence of a
treaty which will be broadly acceptable to a large number of states,
thus facilitating the universality of its acceptance. 63.'

57. Id. at 24.
58. Id.
59. [1951] Y.B. Irr'L L. CoMrM'N, supra note 50, at 6.
60. Id.at 7.
61. [1951] I.C.J. at 22.
62. Id.
63. Id.
63.1. With respect to the adoption of the Convention as a whole, however, it may
be noted that the attainment of consensus may be facilitated Sy the allowance of
reservations.
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Opponents of the no-reservations approach argue that such a
prohibition produces rigidity of law, and that flexibility is enhanced
by the allowance of reservations." However, flexibility may be enhanced by a means other than the use of reservations. For example,
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has considered the inclusion of a system of revision and amendment of the
Convention,"5 although no conclusions have yet been reached on that
question. When a satisfactory system of revision and amendment is
agreed upon, the use of reservations to effect flexibility may not be
necessary. Furthermore, the treaty itself provides a limited degree of
flexibility. This is especially true in regard to the system of settlement of disputes, where not only is a choice of several mechanisms
offered," but where there is also an option to preclude the application of the provided mechanisms altogether in certain cases.67 In addition, flexibility is built into the treaty by means of a Review Conference 8 which will be eml'owered to consider the effectiveness of the
system for exploitation and exploration and, in particular, to determine whether the aims of the international regime have been
achieved.
With respect to those elements of the treaty which are
constitutional in nature, it has already been noted that in customary
practice no reservations are permitted. However, objective methods of
determining the compatibility of reservations to constituent instruments have been discussed, particularly in the context of the
Vienna Convention system which provides for acceptance of a
reservation by the competent organ of the institution being
established. 6 A disadvantage of this system was pointed out during
the negotiations in Vienna by Mr. Cuenca (Spain), who said that:
[N]o reservations [should] be permitted to a treaty which [is]
the constituent instrument of an international organization,
in order to protect that type of treaty at the beginning of its
existence ....
If the reserving States were themselves in a ma-

64. See, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, supra note 8, at 14; and Genocide opinion, [1951] I.C.J. at 26.
65. See U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/91 (1979) at 121-26. These items were considered
at the 2d, 7th, and Resumed 8th sessions of the Conference in the context of its discussions of final clauses.
66. ICNT/Rev. 1, art. 287, note 44 supra.
67. Id. art. 298, which allows a state to make a declaration that the system need
not apply to disputes involving maritime boundary delimitations or military activities, or in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is seized.
68. ICNT/Rev. 1, art. 155, note 44 supra.
69. Vienna Convention, art. 20(3), note 2 supra.
70. Supra note 31, at 109.
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jority among those who had ratified the constituent instrument,
they would be able to decide in the competent organ in favour of
the acceptance of their own reservations. The result would be to
bring about an amendment of the constituent instrument by the
indirect means of reservations. 0
This argument would favor the inclusion of a no-reservations clause.
The most poignant argument against the admissibility of reservations to the Law of the Sea treaty is its character a§ a "package
deal." This characteristic has been discussed previously, as has been
the consequent fragility of the integrity of the treaty, which is a reflection of the many delicate compromises at which the Conference
has arrived. The Law of the Sea treaty is unique as a "package
deal" with respect to its vast scope, the magnitude of its provisions,
and the large number of negotiating states. It is uncontested that
one of the goals of the Third United Nations Conference is to establish a comprehensive unified regime for tl~e regulation of ocean space.
In customary international law, reservations to a restrictive
multilateral treaty are impermissible." A restrictive treaty is one in
respect of which it is apparent that the application in its entirety, as
between the parties, is an essential condition of the consent of each
to be bound." The concept of the "package deal" may be analogized
to that of a restrictive treaty, whereby the acceptance of "the package" as a whole by all states is an essential condition to the acceptance of the whole by each state. This is really the essence of the
concept of "the package." Although restrictive treaties generally
have only a small number of parties, 3 the International Law Commission notes that "the decisive part is [the] intention that the
treaty should be applied in its entirety between all the parties,"'"
and this intention may be present regardless of the number of parties. Furthermore, in either case it would be clear that reservations
are not foreseen. It may, therefore, be undesirable to allow reservations to "the package" of the Law of the Sea treaty, as this may
disrupt the compromises which have taken so long to achieve and
may foil the intentions of the parties in arriving at these
compromises.
CONCLUSION

The comprehensive nature of the proposed Law of the Sea

71.
72.
73.
74.

Vienna Convention, art. 20(2), note 2 supra.
Id.
Id.
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treaty as a legislative and constituent instrument has been discussed, as has its unique nature as a "package deal." In establishing
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the,
General Assembly noted that the closely interrelated problems of
ocean space need to be considered as a whole, and that political and
economic realities have accentuated the need for progressive development of the law of the sea in a framework of close international
cooperation." In striving to attain these goals, it would seem that a
system which is uniform in its application and simple to administer
would be ideal. Such a system could be achieved by the strict prohibition of reservations. Otherwise multiplicity would be introduced
and the application of the Convention may become piecemeal and
complex. Where there is a cry for universality and flexibility of application, it may be said that these are provided by the terms of the
treaty itself.
The pros and cons of the other alternatives presented in conference document A/Conf.62/L.1311 have also been discussed. These
may be workable. to varying degrees and may provide greater flexibility, but each risks the undermining or disrupting of the delicate
balance of compromises which make up the treaty. Where such is
perceived to be the case, it is doubtful whether the goal of universality will be promoted at all. Furtbermore, these alternatives may
themselves involve an extended process of negotiation before agreement is reached. The noninclusion of a clause, on the other hand,
may be an expedient method of dealing with the problem, but this
would present the greatest risk of destroying the integrity of the
treaty.
In the final analysis, then, when the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea next considers these issues, it may be
that the ideal aproach of excluding all reservations would prove to
be the most popular choice, bearing in mind the objects and purposes of the proposed Law of the Sea Convention.

75. G.A. Res. 2750 C, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 26 (1970).
76. Note 17 supra.

